



Revitalizing Multilateral Governance at the World Trade Organization

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
Plan of the presentation

- Summary of 2018 Bertelsmann Stiftung report
- Responses/reactions to date
- Supporting WTO reform: possible areas for further study/analysis

Background to the report


- Increasing use of trade distorting policy measures
 - "Make it here!" as opposed to "made in the world"
 - Not just US China, other emerging economies (e.g., India...)
- "Rise of the rest"
- Geopolitical/geo-economic systemic competition/conflict
 - China Inc. technology; IPRs; national security
 - Iran, Russia, US foreign policy & trade/investment sanctions
- Technological change; structural transformation: servicification & growth of the digital economy
- All generate spillovers & call for international cooperation of rules of the game

Increasing use of trade-distorting policies





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Global use of trade-distorting measures, 2009-18



Digital trade and services trade restrictions





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WTO: missing in action

- WTO rulebook outdated little progress in updating it since 1995
- Working practices are part of the problem:
 - 1. Consensus used to block regular WTO activities, including deliberation/discussion. 2001 Doha round agenda held to define what can be discussed. Premise of a "single undertaking" approach
 - 2. Special and differential treatment: Development differences are very real and important, but SDT arguably outdated, ineffective and needs to distinguish better between LDCs/low-income and middle-income/more advanced economies
- Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) used to fill some gaps, but inherently limited
 - Downsides: are discriminatory; fragment the trading system; do not address major sources of competitive distortions/spillovers as that requires all major players to participate; can give rise to political challenges/negotiating costs that are similar to broader multilateral deals for smaller returns

Addressing trade tensions/updating rules

- Improve organizational performance so as to:
 - bolster transparency (monitoring & information on policies/implementation)
 - provide a venue for deliberation and (re-)negotation of rules
 - resolve disagreements on operation of dispute settlement mechanism (Appellate Body)
- NB: Lot of positives—WTO not moribund
 - Achievements since 2008 include Agreement on Trade Facilitation, ban on agricultural export subsidies, expansion of the Information Technology Agreement
 - Regular work: Committees, dispute settlement, Aid for Trade
 - Buenos Aires: launch of 4 plurilateral joint initiatives
- Demonstrates that working practice constraints are not necessarily binding

Six process/working practice-oriented recommendations

- More policy dialogue: identify and address systemically important negative spillover impacts of non-tariff policies
- 2. Foster greater substantive deliberation in WTO committees
- Pursue plurilateral initiatives on new issues where there is a critical mass starting with leveraging elements of recent PTAs in new areas
- 4. Bolster the knowledge support function of the Secretariat
- Initiate regular review of organizational performance
- Deepen engagement with business community and general public

See: https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/revitalizingmultilateral-governance-at-the-world-trade-organization/

Policy dialogue to establish road map / work program

- Identify/assess problems & potential solutions to address adverse international effects of policies
 - Which policies create the largest negative <u>systemic</u> effects (spillovers)?
 - E.g., subsidies not necessarily welfare-reducing ...
- Clearly need agreement between EU/Japan/US to discuss structural/systemic differences re: China's development and growth strategy
 - Unlikely that US-China trade war will resolve systemic differences
- As important that matters critical to other WTO members be considered/addressed
 - Agriculture; fish subsidies; climate-related trade policies, etc.
- Seeking to isolate/target China ignores need for balance across issues (reciprocity)
 - Many of the issues relating to WTO operation have nothing to do with China e.g., dispute settlement; use of plurilateral approaches – or go beyond China

Strengthen regular WTO business

- Revisit objectives/work programs: What is the aim? Do WTO bodies serve interests of national constituencies effectively?
- Transparency: What information is needed? What is not a priority? Identify approaches
 to collect needed information most efficiently
 - Greater focus on technical assistance that targets implementation and periodic review
- Development: Assess what constitutes good practices, whether agreements embody these and what constrains a country from adopting them
- Enhance support role for the Secretariat & other international organizations
 - Members may not be able to provide the inputs needed for Committees to be more effective
- More engagement with stakeholders in WTO work
 - Solicit more regular input and feedback from business associations/regulatory bodies
- Evaluate institutional performance to foster learning & bolster accountability
- Ex-post assessments of outcomes of WTO agreements and processes
 - Including analysis of distributional and dynamic effects

Open plurilateralism: smaller group, issue-specific cooperation

- A response to consensus constraint but also to differences in preferences and capacities
- Will work best (be easier) for policy areas that are regulatory in nature and apply equally to national and foreign firms or products
 - E.g., good regulatory practices or initiatives to lower trade/operating costs for firms
- If the policies concerned create significant spillovers all major players need to participate – but not all WTO members ("critical mass agreements")
- Open processes critical
 - Secretariat support; non-parties kept informed—openness an asset, not a liability
- Critical mass agreements nothing new for WTO
- Need to address concerns of non-participating WTO members to provide credible assurance that plurilateral agreements will be open ex post

Responses to the recommendations & WTO reform initiatives to date

- Report presented in several countries Canada; China; Japan; New Zealand; South Korea; US—and in Geneva
- Reactions to recommendations generally supportive
 - Some worries about monitoring and evaluation of performance of WTO as an organization
 - Representatives of India and South Africa oppose plurilateral agreements and critical of argument that current form of SDT is passé / ineffective (notwithstanding call to emulate TFA approach)
- Many sought more detailed analysis of specific policies/views on priorities and posed "sequencing questions": pursue complementary tracks; should dealing with AB dispute be a precondition for moving forward?
 - Suggestion to reflect more broadly on how to better address disputes and re-assess trend towards judicialization one difference with thrust of EU/partners proposal on AB dispute
- Canadian-led process has picked up some of the ideas, especially focus on deliberation in Committees and regular work/link to transparency/monitoring
- Many elements of EU proposals (with other countries) consistent with thrust of the report

Emerging ideas for follow-up activities

- Analysis of specific subjects for potential OPAs (open plurilateral agreements)
 - E.g., policies affecting cross-border data flows and trade in services/servicification: unpacking this
 into different parts and identifying areas that are more technical than political; research to quantify
 potential economic effects of cooperation/policy reform
- Industrial subsidies
 - Technologies to boost information & transparency (big data); analysis of spillovers; approaches to complement per se rules with assessing effects; building on competition-policy mechanisms
- Deepening analysis on the nexus of notifications/transparency; regular Committee work; peer review
 - E.g., lessons from product standards area; OECD, APEC, IMF/WB (indicators)
- OPA governance: learning from sectoral cooperation; a code of conduct/reference paper to make commitment to openness and multilateralization credible (enforceable)
- Analysis of the political economy of dispute resolution: incentive effects of judicialization; alternative instruments (existing and new) and remedies

What scope for open MFN plurilateralism?

Characteristics	Main issue	Approach	Type of spillover	Type of cooperation	
				Critical mass (MFN)	Clubs (discriminatory)
Trade agreements: No severability; binding State-to- State package deals with fixed terms	Market access	Cross-issue linkage	Market access effects of discriminatory trade policies	Multi-issue multilateral agreements (E.g.: Uruguay Round)	Reciprocal PTAs (E.g. CETA, CPTPP, USMCA, etc.)
and dispute resolution	400000	Enforcement linkage	Market access effects of domestic regulatory policies	Single issue agreements (e.g. Telecom Reference paper; ITA)	Issue-specific clubs (Art. II.3 WTO Plurilateral Agreements— e.g. GPA)
				Plurilateral initiatives	
				Unconditional application (MFN)	Conditional application
Regulatory cooperation: Open, non-binding (severable); issue- specific	Regulatory heterogeneity	Within-issue linkage	Pecuniary or non- pecuniary spillovers	International product or process standards (Codex Alimentarius; ISO)	Mutual recognition agreements; regulatory equivalence regimes (BASA; EU adequacy determinations; EU FLEGT regime for timber)
				Identification of good regulatory practices (OECD, APEC)	
Mixed models: Regulation-market access linkage	Regulatory heterogeneity	Enforcement linkage	Pecuniary or non- pecuniary spillovers	WTO Trade facilitation Agreement (TFA)	Exporter country commitments to apply importer country standards (Mattoo, 2018)

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