

Go Ahead and Trade: the Impact of Uncertainty Removal in the EU's GSP scheme¹

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World Trade Forum
26 October 2019



¹This project has received funding from the European Unions Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 770680 (RESPECT)

Motivation and Context - NRTPs

The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the EU offers non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs) to developing countries.

Studies on specific preferential schemes, with product level data, find positive impacts of NRTPs on trade of beneficiaries:

- ▶ Thelle et al. (2015): EU GSP preferences boost exports of covered products (5% on average).
- ▶ Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, (2010): AGOA preferences led to 13% increase in US imports.
- ▶ Hakobyan (2017a, 2017b): exclusion from US GSP, or its temporary expiration, harms imports of affected products.

Motivation and Context - NRTPs uncertainty

Uncertainty has long been seen as a hurdle to NRTPs effectiveness.

- ▶ "Donors" have discretion to revoke them, which might reduce investment in eligible products or RoOs compliance (Ornelas 2016, Limao 2016).
- ▶ GSP schemes have limited duration, expire and need periodic renewal.
- ▶ GSP schemes feature mechanisms for preference removal, which increase insecurity.

This paper studies directly the **trade impact of NRTPs uncertainty**.

Motivation and Context - TPU

The impact of trade policy uncertainty (**TPU**) on trade has been addressed by a recent literature. E.g.:

- ▶ Handley (2014): large **tariff overhangs** limit entry of exporters (Australia)
- ▶ Handley and Limao (2015, 2017): **EU entry** of Portugal and **China WTO accession** explain large fractions of export growth post-entry/accession.
- ▶ Brexit effect:
 - ▶ Crowley et al. (2018b): **switch to renegotiation regime** reduces entry of UK exporters into EU.
 - ▶ Graziano et al. (2018): **uncertainty pre-referendum** reduces UK-EU trade.
- ▶ **This paper**: impact of NRTPs uncertainty removal in the 2014 **reform of the EU's GSP**.

The EU's GSP

The EU's GSP is divided in three sub-schemes, with increasing stability of preferences and level of market access in the EU.

- ▶ Standard GSP: lower than MFN or zero tariffs on 66% of 8-digit tariff lines.
 - ▶ Low and lower-middle income countries with no other PTA with EU.
- ▶ GSP+: duty free import of approx. the same tariff lines as standard GSP
 - ▶ For vulnerable GSP members which ratify a list of conventions.
- ▶ EBA: duty free imports on products all but arms
 - ▶ For Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

Graduation: mechanisms of preference removal:

- ▶ All GSP members are subject to income related *country-graduation*.
- ▶ Standard GSP and GSP+ (up to 2014) subject to competitiveness related *country-section graduation*.

Competitiveness related graduation

The EU removes GSP preferences from competitive country-section pairs if:

- ▶ a country's share of EU imports of GSP eligible products in a section, out of total EU GSP imports in that section, exceed a certain threshold:
 - ▶ threshold currently set at 57% (47.5% for textiles).
 - ▶ graduations are decided at 3-year intervals

Graduation threshold generates uncertainty.

- ▶ A country can lose GSP preferences in a section:
 - ▶ if its EU imports increase
 - ▶ if other GSP members' EU imports decrease
- ▶ higher uncertainty for country-sections closer to the threshold

2014 reform of the EU's GSP

General aim: make preferences more meaningful and predictable.

1. Meaningfulness: focus on countries most in need
 - ▶ Graduate all upper-middle income countries, countries with alternative PTAs with EU and territories under control of EU
 - ▶ Membership was cut from 177 to 88 countries
2. Predictability:
 - ▶ **Remove competitiveness-related graduation for GSP+ members.**
 - ▶ The threshold removal for GSP+ countries could have eliminated NRTPs uncertainty
 - ▶ Our contribution is to assess whether the reform affected GSP+ countries' trade, and to isolate the role of NRTPs uncertainty removal.

Data

- ▶ **Product level** import data (COMEXT) at the CN-8 digits product level, 2009-2016.
- ▶ **Tariff** data (TRAINS): CN-8-digit level, 2009-2016
 - ▶ GSP, GSP+, EBA product eligibility information
 - ▶ GSP, MFN and other EU PTA tariff schedules
- ▶ **GSP membership** (EU regulations): GSP, GSP+ and EBA membership, and graduation episodes.

Methodology - main impact of reform

We adopt a triple-difference estimator *a' la* Frazer & Van Biesebroeck (2010) and exploit three sources of variation:

- ▶ GSP+ members vs non-members: $GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}$ (country-section level)
- ▶ GSP+ eligible vs non-eligible products: $GSPplus_{k,t}^{prod}$ (8-digit level)
- ▶ time-varying effect of reform: ref_t (pre- post-2014)

$$\ln(imp)_{k,cs,t} = \beta_1(ref_t * GSPplus_{k,t}^{prod} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}) + \gamma_{cs,t} + \delta_{k,t} + \lambda_{cs,k} + \varepsilon_{k,cs,t}$$

Identification comes from country-section-product (cs,k) specific changes in imports post-reform, relative to their pre-reform average.

Methodology - uncertainty or better market access?

Some tariffs could have changed for GSP+ members, e.g. Pakistan moved from GSP to GSP+ in 2014

To separate the impact of the change in uncertainty from that of better market access, we construct 2 binary variables:

- ▶ $GSPplus_{cs,k}^{prod, \Delta pref=0}$, 1 if a country-product tariff *margin* is unchanged in 2014
- ▶ $GSPplus_{cs,k}^{prod, \Delta pref \neq 0}$, 1 if a country-product tariff *margin* changed in 2014

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(imp)_{k,cs,t} = & \beta_1(ref_t * GSPplus_{cs,k}^{prod, \Delta pref=0} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}) + \\ & \beta_2(ref_t * GSPplus_{cs,k}^{prod, \Delta pref \neq 0} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}) + \\ & \gamma_{cs,t} + \delta_{k,t} + \lambda_{cs,k} + \varepsilon_{k,cs,t} \end{aligned}$$

Table: Impact of 2014 reform on EU imports from GSP+ countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)
$ref_t * GSPplus_{k,t}^{prod} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}$	0.0727** (0.036)	0.0680* (0.036)	
$ln(\tau_{k,cs,t})$		-0.628*** (0.163)	
$ref_t * GSPplus_{cs,k}^{prod, \Delta pref = 0} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}$			0.0718* (0.039)
$ref_t * GSPplus_{cs,k}^{prod, \Delta pref \neq 0} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}$			0.0749* (0.044)
Country-section-year FE	y	y	y
Product-year FE	y	y	y
Country-section-product FE	y	y	y
<i>N</i>	881137	881137	881137

Note: Standard errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

Intensity of NRTPs uncertainty

The uncertainty decreases with the distance from the grad. threshold: its removal should have induced more trade for country-section pairs close to it.

We construct the **distance** from the threshold, as the ratio between import shares (pre-reform rules, 2009-11 data) and the pre-reform threshold.

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(\text{imp})_{k,cs,t} = & \beta_1(\text{ref}_t * \text{GSPplus}_{k,t}^{\text{prod}} * \text{GSPplus}_{cs,t}^{\text{member}}) + \beta_2 \text{dist}_{cs} + \\ & \beta_3 [(\text{ref}_t * \text{GSPplus}_{k,t}^{\text{prod}} * \text{GSPplus}_{cs,t}^{\text{member}}) * \text{dist}_{cs}] + \\ & \eta \ln(\tau_{k,cs,t}) + \gamma_{cs,t} + \delta_{k,t} + \lambda_{cs,k} + \varepsilon_{k,cs,t} \end{aligned}$$

Alternatively, we construct three binary variables, which separate the country-sections pairs in the following categories:

- ▶ $\text{GSPplus}_{cs,t}^{\text{member},5pp}$ for import-shares < 5 pp from the threshold
- ▶ $\text{GSPplus}_{cs,t}^{\text{member},5-10pp}$ for import-shares 5-10 pp from the threshold
- ▶ $\text{GSPplus}_{cs,t}^{\text{member},>10pp}$ for import-shares > 10 pp from the threshold

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(\text{imp})_{k,cs,t} = & \beta_1(\text{ref}_t * \text{GSPplus}_{k,t}^{\text{prod}} * \text{GSPplus}_{cs,t}^{\text{member}}) + \beta_2 \text{dist}_{cs} + \\ & \beta_3 [(\text{ref}_t * \text{GSPplus}_{k,t}^{\text{prod}} * \text{GSPplus}_{cs,t}^{\text{member}}) * \text{dist}_{cs}] + \\ & \eta \ln(\tau_{k,cs,t}) + \gamma_{cs,t} + \delta_{k,t} + \lambda_{cs,k} + \varepsilon_{k,cs,t} \end{aligned}$$

Table: Relevance of distance from graduation threshold

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$ref_t * GSPplus_{k,t}^{prod} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}$	0.0481 (0.038)	0.0443 (0.038)		
$(ref_t * GSPplus_{k,t}^{prod} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}) * dist_{cs}$	0.640** (0.282)	0.619** (0.282)		
$ln(\tau_{k,cs,t})$		-0.622*** (0.163)		-0.623*** (0.163)
$ref_t * GSPplus_{k,t}^{prod} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member,5pp}$			0.540*** (0.190)	0.521*** (0.191)
$ref_t * GSPplus_{k,t}^{prod} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member,5-10pp}$			0.528*** (0.150)	0.495*** (0.150)
$ref_t * GSPplus_{k,t}^{prod} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member,>10pp}$			0.0663* (0.037)	0.0618* (0.037)
Country-section-year FE	y	y	y	y
Product-year FE	y	y	y	y
Country-section-product FE	y	y	y	y
<i>N</i>	881137	881137	881137	881137

Note: Standard errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

Timing of reform - uncertainty vs competition

The reform reduced GSP membership, which could have conferred a competitive advantage to GSP+ countries.

- ▶ To disentangle the Δ uncertainty vs Δ competition we exploit the timing of the reform
 - ▶ The reform was announced in 2012 (EU regulation), but applied in 2014.
 - ▶ In 2013 **competition is unchanged**, but **uncertainty has changed**
- ▶ We recode the reform variable as taking value 1 from 2013 onwards, and use interactions with time dummies, from 2013 to 2016, to estimate the impact of the reform announcement in 2013

$$\ln(\text{imp})_{k,cs,t} = \sum_{t=13}^{16} \left[\beta_{1,t} (\text{ref}_t * \text{GSPplus}_{cs,k}^{\text{prod}, \Delta \text{pref}=0} * \text{GSPplus}_{cs,t}^{\text{member}}) + \right. \\ \left. \beta_{2,t} (\text{ref}_t * \text{GSPplus}_{cs,k}^{\text{prod}, \Delta \text{pref} \neq 0} * \text{GSPplus}_{cs,t}^{\text{member}}) \right] * T_t + \\ \gamma_{cs,t} + \delta_{k,t} + \lambda_{cs,k} + \varepsilon_{k,cs,t}$$

Table: Impact of reform announcement

		(1)	(2)	(3)
$ref_t * GSPplus_{k,t}^{prod} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}$	2013	-0.0251 (0.050)	-0.0265 (0.050)	
	2014	0.0649 (0.055)	0.0562 (0.055)	
	2015	0.0365 (0.047)	0.0392 (0.047)	
	2016	0.101** (0.048)	0.0917* (0.048)	
				-0.620*** (0.163)
$ref_t * GSPplus_{cs,k}^{prod, \Delta pref=0} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}$	2013			0.141*** (0.049)
	2014			0.0783 (0.057)
	2015			0.0728 (0.050)
	2016			0.121** (0.052)
$ref_t * GSPplus_{cs,k}^{prod, \Delta pref \neq 0} * GSPplus_{cs,t}^{member}$	2013			0.0348 (0.060)
	2014			0.214** (0.088)
	2015			0.0165 (0.057)
	2016			0.108* (0.056)
Country-section-year FE		y	y	y
Product-year FE		y	y	y
Country-section-product FE		y	y	y
<i>N</i>		881137	881137	881137

Note: Standard errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001



Conclusion and way forward

- ▶ The 2014 reform of the EU GSP programme removed the "threat" of competitiveness related graduations for GSP+ countries, which caused an increase in EU imports from GSP+ countries, by **7%** on average
- ▶ We provide evidence that the reform reduced uncertainty of NRTPs:
 - ▶ The effect is robust to excluding changes in pref. margins.
 - ▶ Δ imports is stronger for country-sections "close" to grad. threshold
- ▶ The increase in EU imports is not matched by a decrease in ROW imports - no trade re-direction (not shown today)
- ▶ Additional exercises and ongoing work:
 - ▶ Estimated the impact of the reform by utilization rates groups
 - ▶ Explore the impact of reform on medium and high-tech products, likely to have a high investment intensities (higher investment intensity should be more responsive to a Δ uncertainty)

Thank you.